China’s Compliance to International Health Law and Its Implication to Global Health Security

: The Covid 19 pandemic presented a defining challenge to public health and global security. The outbreak of the pandemic in China and its global implications raised persistent doubts of states’ compliance to international health laws. The pandemic therefore, provides an opportunity for us to ascertain the extent to which China adhered to the International Health Regulations. Though a great deal of experts have scrutinized Chinese public health policies in the aftermath of the pandemic, China’s compliance to the 2005 International Health Regulation and its implication to global health security remained unclear. The analysis is largely derived from the Global Health Security-GHS Index and other primary legal texts. The GHS Index represents the first comprehensive unit of measurement of global health security across 195 countries that are parties to the 2005 International Health Regulations. The outcome of the analysis exposed significant gaps in China’s compliance to international health laws. It also indicates that, though international health laws provide useful guidance to prevent, respond and manage pandemics, they are implemented in an ad hoc manner and generally have few tools at their disposal to enforce compliance. China’s failure to timely and adequately discharge its duties under the International Health Regulation prior to and in the wake of Covid 19 shows that the international community needs a new legal enforcement mechanism to ensure that states act promptly, transparently and effectively to protect the world’s population against pandemics. The challenge of a lack of statutory enforcement mechanism is insurmountable and it remains uncertain what the future holds for global health security.


Introduction
International health law is a relatively new sub field within the discipline of International Law.In its broadest definition, it includes all international legal regimes specifically designed to address threats to public health.The most notable international legal regime that focuses on cross border infectious diseases is the 2005 International Health Regulations (Ruger, 2008).Over the past two decades, international health laws have been multilaterally developed by global actors through the constitution of the World Health Organization.By far, the International Health Regulation (IHR), represents the most important international health law relating to the prevention, control and respond of infectious diseases that constitute a Public Health Emergency of International Concern.The 2005 IHR constitute the only international legal agreement on communicable diseases that binds WHO member states.It provides unified and standardized codes of conduct for infectious disease control (IHR Report, 2005).Thus, the 2005 IHR is the major legal instrument employed to prevent crossborder transfers of pathogenic threats and to ensure that citizens in all parts of the world attain the minimal threshold vital for public health.The purpose of IHR is to ensure maximum security against the emergence and spread of infectious diseases within and across national borders.Ensuring compliance with the IHR remains a crucial task for States parties and international organizations.
However, the outbreak of Covid 19 have raised doubts on the effectiveness of IHR as an instrument for global health security.The initial outbreak of the pandemic in China and its global implications have raised persistent doubts on the country's compliance to IHR.Although Habibi, et al (2020) and a great deal of experts have scrutinized Chinese public health policies in the aftermath of the coronavirus pandemic, China's compliance to International Health laws and its implication to global health security remained unclear.It is on the basis of this uncertainty that this article examined China's compliance to the 2005 IHR prior to and during the outbreak of Covid 19.The outcome of the analysis unveils significant gaps in the national and International Health Regulations.Therefore, the coronavirus pandemic presents an era of defining challenge to public health and the global security.The world will continue to face natural, accidental or deliberate threat to global health security unless stringent legal measures are introduced to prevent the release and spread of pathogens that constitute an existential threat to public health.Within this context.The purpose of this article is spur global actors to improve preparedness against infectious diseases that infectious diseases that constitute a Public Health Emergency of International concern.The outbreak of the current Covid 19 provide another opportunity for us to ascertain the extent to which China adheres to IHR.The analysis permits Chinese authorities to understand where their gap lies.At the same time, it also allows international organizations, particularly the WHO to comprehend where its gap exist and how it can make amends.
The outcome of the analysis largely relied on information drawn from the Global Health Security-GHS Index and other sources.The GHS Index is the first comprehensive unit of measurement of global health security across 195 countries that are parties to the 2005 International Health Regulations.The GHS Index is a joint research project of the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security (JHU), The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)- (GHS Index, 2019).Although other valuable tools such as the State Annual Reports measures national compliance to IHR, the GHS Index complements and builds upon existing national tools by adding and integrating detailed information that allows for deeper analysis of states compliance to International Health Laws.The GHS index involved an international panel of experts from 13 countries who created a detailed and comprehensive framework of analysis.The questions that assess a country's compliance with IHR were structured across 6 main variables, 34 indicators and 85 sub indicators.A total of about 110 researchers and reviewers spent more than 15,000 hours over the course of one year to collect open-source data for the index.The GHS index entirely relied on open-source information, that is public information that is published and reported or that which was reported by an international body.The data was drawn from the following sources: national legal texts and legal reports; government publications and reports; academic publications and reports; websites of government authorities; reports of international organizations, and non-governmental organizations; local and international news media reports (GHS Index, 2019).The data was collected across 140 qualitative and quantitative questions.Although a majority of the qualitative 526 question were binary with Yes or No responses, a selected few were open ended questions framed to capture more nuanced observations.Each question had an index score that ranged from 0-100.The higher value was associated with more favourable healthy security condition.This article is structured into four main parts, the first section introduces the main problem, purpose of research coupled with the research methods introduced to measure China's compliance to international health laws.The second section presents the legal framework or an overview of International Health Laws relating to the prevention, control and management of infectious diseases that constitute a Public Health Emergency of International concern.To this end, emphasis is placed on the purpose and scope of the 2005 International Health Regulations.The third section is devoted to the analysis of China's Compliance to the 2005 IHR.Here the analysis is cantered on six main variables identified in the GHS index.The Final section details the implications of Chinese compliance to global health security, it unveils the significant gaps in China's public health and International Health Regulations.The concluding part proffers what the future holds and what can be done for the essential standard of global health security to be maintained.

Legal Framework: An Overview of International Health Law
In the early days of the rise of sovereign states and international law, the world's imperial powers promulgated a type of international health law to eliminate threats of infectious diseases that affected communities around the globe.Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century through to the 1950s, numerous international legal regimes addressed issues of public health, particularly infectious diseases.For example, the international sanitary convention created in 1882 controlled the spread of infectious diseases until 1951 (Fidler, & Gostin, 2006).However, on April 7, 1948 the United Nations established the World Health Organization as a special agency for global health.WHO's constitution laid the foundation of the new international law on public health.The new law came into force as a multilateral initiative and surveillance tool for infectious diseases.WHO initially implemented the Regulation in 1969 to monitor and control the outbreak of six infectious diseases which include, cholera, yellow fever, plague, smallpox, typhus and relapsing fever.The International Health Regulation was originally adopted by WHO in 1951and later amended in 1969. According to Kamradt & Rushton, (2012) by the mid-1990s IHR had lost its effectiveness and relevancy as a tool for global health security.The regulation lacked a clear legal structure and was implemented in an ad hoc manner.By the 1990s the resurgence of a series of old and new infectious diseases in many parts of the world exposed the limitations of the exiting regulation.
The 1969 regulation restricted surveillance to information provided only by governments, lacked provisions to permit WHO to speedily assess and investigate a likely public health risks, contained no guidelines and strategies for developing surveillance capacities and WHO member states to comply by the existing regulation (Silver, 2008).The outbreak of cholera in South America, the plague in India and the emergence of new infectious diseases such as Ebola motivated the World Health Assembly (WHA) to revise and strengthen the existing law at the time.In 1995, WHA passed a new resolution in favour of revising the global health law.The advent of globalization coupled with the deterioration of public health infrastructures in developed and developing nations created an unprecedented opportunity for the spread of infectious diseases, especially the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome -SARS (WHA, 2005).The IHR to control infectious diseases proved insufficient and unrealistic (Silver, 2008).
On May 23, 2005 the World Health Assembly adopted the new IHR, the new IHR was a culmination of a decade-long revision process that represented a historic development in international law and public health.The new IHR was adopted by the World Health Assembly as an international treaty.The regulation represented a major development in the use of international law for public health purposes.The 2005 IHR radically departed from the 1969 IHR, it strengthened the authority of states to control of infectious diseases, transformed the international legal context in which states exercise their public health sovereignty, expanded its scope, included more demanding obligations for state parties to conduct surveillance and response, and incorporated human rights principles on public health issues.After reviewing the major legal provisions of the IHR, particularly its purpose, scope and obligations, this article examines the extent to which China comply with IHR in the aftermath of the coronavirus outbreak.

Purpose and Scope of IHR
The 2005 IHR contain 66 articles organized into ten parts and include nine annexes as illustrated in the Table below.This section places more emphasis on the purpose, scope, principles and responsibilities of authorities.Article 2 of the newly revised IHR clearly underlines its purpose and scope, the purpose and scope are "to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade" (IHR Report, 2005).The article contains a number of specifications a) It specified that the scope of implementation was not limited to any particular infectious disease or means of transmission, but covers all illnesses and medical conditions that constitute a threat to human beings irrespective of the origin.b) the article obliges WHO member states to develop core public health capacities at local, national, and regional levels to prevent, protect, and control the spread of infectious diseases c) it also specified the obligation of state parties to notify the WHO of incidence that may constitute public health emergency of international concern d.) it authorized WHO of the right to obtain information from individuals, to take into account unofficial reports on public health and verify such reports with state parties.Prior regulation for the protection of international diseases did not include human rights principles.The revised legislation incorporated human rights principles relating to issues of human dignity, privacy, and liberty.Article 3 (1) proclaimed that "the implementation of IHR shall be in full respect of dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons" (IHR Report, 2005).The new IHR incorporated human rights principles in order to control the effects of public health interventions on civil and political rights, particularly freedom of movement and security of persons.Article 3 (1) underlined conditions that state parties fulfil for a public health action or measure to lawfully restrict civil and political rights a) the public health measure must be taken due to pressing public or social need b) the public health measure must pursue a legitimate goal c) the action must be proportionate to the legitimate goal d) the rights-restricting measure must be implemented in a non-discriminatory manner.This article further buttressed the fact that individuals deprived of their liberty as a result of public health measures must be treated with humanity and respect for their inherent human dignity.Doubts have always been raised whether or not IHR conform to international human rights principles.This article notes that the new public health law includes human rights principles and comply with regulations of international human rights law.The regulation ruled in article 42 that all heath measures taken pursuant IHR shall be enforced in a transparent and non-discriminatory manner.In addition, article 32 decreed that in implementing health measures, States officials shall treat foreigners and travellers with respect to human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms.They must avoid any discomfort or distress associated with the implementation of public health rules.They shall treat all foreigners and travellers with courtesy and respect (IHR Report, 2005).Also, the gender, sociocultural, ethnic or religious concerns of travellers shall be taken into consideration and adequate food and water, appropriate accommodation, clothing, baggage protection, medical treatment and means of communication shall be provided to quarantined and isolated travellers without biased.

Right to Privacy and Consent
The new IHR contained important human rights provisions on respect of privacy and the right to seek prior consent.Article 23 (3) proclaimed that "no medical examination or health measure under these Regulations shall be carried out on travellers without their prior express consent or except in situations that warrant compulsory measures" (IHR Report, 2005).The new IHR also protected the right to privacy as it underpinned in article 45 (1) that "all health information collected or received by a State Party from another State Party or from the WHO shall be kept confidential and processed anonymously in accordance to national law" (WHA, 2005).Thus, in order to address public health risk state officials and WHO must ensure that the disclosure and processing of personal information protects individual privacy (Article 45.2) The Regulations also authorise the WHO to release personal data of individuals upon their request.
Although the new IHR contained important human rights provisions on respect of privacy and the right to seek prior consent, problems and questions still surrounds this part of the legislation.As concerns privacy, the new IHR authorize state parties to protect individuals' privacy and to treat confidential data according to national law.Article 45 (1) make the protection of individual privacy under the new IHR a subject of national law rather than a subject to internationally recognized privacy standards.Thus, the protection of individual privacy depends on national laws and is relative from one national legal system to another.Protection of individual privacy lacks internationally recognized standards pursuant to IHR.Nonetheless, the extent to which the new IHR incorporates human rights principles means that international human rights law is a sine qua non to detect, prevent and respond to threats of infectious diseases.Pursuant to these regulations, states parties should have human rights principles in mind as they build the capacities required for global health security.

Surveillance and Notification Obligations
One of the most important aspects of the 2005 IHR was the establishment of a standard surveillance system for public health emergencies of international concern.The regulation order states parties to develop, strengthen, and maintain core surveillance and notification capacities.Article 5 (1) clearly states that "each State Party shall develop, strengthen and maintain, as soon as possible but no later than five years from the entry into force of these regulations for that State Party, the capacity to detect, assess, notify and report events in accordance with these Regulation" (IHR Report, 2005).
Owed to the fact the new IHR entered into force in 2007, state parties of the new legislation were compelled to fulfil to capacity obligations five years later, that is by 2012.However, article 5 (2) decreed that in exceptional circumstances state 529 parties may apply for two years extension to develop its national surveillance and response capacities against infectious diseases.The provision further mandate parties to the new law to develop core capacities that aim to detect, report and respond to risk at local, national and regional levels.
Most importantly article 7 of the IHR obliges states parties to notify WHO of all events within their territories that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern.It rules as follows: "If a State Party has evidence of an unexpected or unusual public health event within its territory, irrespective of the origin or source, which may constitute a public health emergency of international concern, it shall provide WHO with all relevant public health information" (Article 7).
Article 8 further obliges state parties to notify WHO of events that do not meet the criteria for formal notification but may still be a public health emergency of international concern.The new IHR was specially designed to enhance the proactive notification of emerging infectious diseases that often occur unexpectedly and are likely to spread beyond national borders.Upon assessment of a public health event, article 6 compelled states to use the most efficient means of communication to notify the WHO of any event that constitute a public health concern within its national territory.The notification is expected to be done within 24 hours of the assessment (World Health Organization, 2005).Even after initial notification, the state owes a continues obligation to provide all relevant public health information to the WHO in a timely and accurate manner.
Certain questions and concerns still surround the legal dispositions of surveillance and notification of public health emergencies of international concern.The most important pressing question relates to the availability of financial and technical resource needed to build appropriate surveillance capacity in developing and least developed countries.Although the new law urged parties to IHR to provide financial and technical resources, it was non-binding (IHR Report, 2005).It failed to make it obligatory for state parties to provide financial and technical resources to build their surveillance capacity.Another major problem that undermine the functional capacity the law surrounds the issue of notification.It is highly probable that states wilfully violate article 6 and fail to report cases of infectious diseases for fear of economic repercussions.These concerns affect the effective implementation of IHR, as shall be seen below, the WHO has no enforcement mechanism pursuant to the new regulation.

China's Compliance to the 2005 International Health Regulations
The Global Health Security (GHS) Index is the first comprehensive unit of measurement of global health security across 195 countries who are parties to the 2005 International Health Regulations.The GHS Index is a joint research project of the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security (JHU), The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) (GHS Index, 2019).The outbreak of the 2014 Ebola epidemic in West Africa that spilled over to other parts of the world was a wakeup call to global health security.The ramifications of the Ebola epidemic in Africa and other countries around globe expose the gap in IHR and the unreadiness of states to detect and prevent the emergence of infectious diseases.The outbreak of the current covid 19 provide another opportunity for us to ascertain extent to which countries around the world adheres to IHR.The world will continue to face natural, accidental or deliberate threat to global health security, so it is important to measure the extent to which states are prepared and ready to combat the release and spread of pathogens that constitute an existential threat to public health.Within this context, GHS Index provides a comprehensive assessment of a country's compliance with International Health Regulations.
The Global Health Security project was jointly funded by three foundations: First, the Open Philanthropist foundation a research and grant making organization, second, the Robertson Foundation that offers grants in three principal areas including education, environment and medical research.Third, the Bill and Melinda Gate Foundation.An international panel of experts from 13 countries created a detailed and comprehensive framework of 140 questions.The questions that assess a country's capability to prevent and mitigate the outbreak of epidemics and pandemics were structured across 6 main variables, 34 indicators and 85 sub indicators.A total of about 110 researchers and reviewers spent more than 15,000 hours over the course one year to collect open-source data for the GHS index (GHS Index, 2019).The GHS index entirely relied on open-source information, that is public information that is published and reported or that which is reported by an international body.The data was drawn from the following sources: legal texts and legal reports; government publications and reports; academic reports; websites of government authorities; international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations; local and international news media reports.
Following the process of data collection, the project team provided each country with an opportunity to validate its data.Thus, to ensure that the research produces results with high degree of validity and reliability, the research team provided officials at the United Nations Mission in New York and at embassies in Washington D.C the opportunity to validate their data.The data was collected across 140 qualitative and quantitative questions.Although a majority of the qualitative question were binary with Yes or No responses, a selected few were open ended questions framed to capture more nuanced observations.Each question had an index score that ranged from 0-100.The higher value was associated with more favourable healthy security condition.The six main categories or variables illustrated in the First, the prevention variable ascertains the degree to which states avert health risk considered as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern.It measured the rate of antimicrobial resistance, zoonotic disease, biosecurity, biosafety, and immunization.Second, the detection and reporting variable scrutinised health surveillance and reporting system countries.Third, rapid response assessed the level emergency preparedness, access to communication network, and readiness to impose trade and travel restrictions.Fourth, robust health investigated the health capacity in clinics, hospitals, and community care centres.It measured access of health care, personnel deployment; communications with healthcare workers during a public health emergency; availability of equipment; and capacity to test and approve new countermeasures.Firth on international norms ascertained the rate of adherence to international agreements on public health, observance of international commitments on financing; and the sharing of genetic and biological data and specimens.Finally, the risk variable scrutinized the level of environmental and biological risks of unprecedented scale that could cause severe damage to human wellbeing.The inclusion of this variable was based on the firm belief that threats related to infectious diseases, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate, have the potential to kill millions of people and cause Public Health Emergency of International Concern.Findings from the 2019 GHS index reveals that, China was not fully prepared for an epidemic or pandemic.The Chinese global preparedness is weak, they did not show enough evidence of the health security capacities and capabilities needed to prevent, detect, and respond to the outbreak of infectious diseases such as the Covid 19.The average index score for China is 48.2 while her position ranked in 195 countries assessed is 51.There is sufficient evidence that China did not comply with important health laws nor showed signs that they would be functional in an events of a global health crisis.The findings expose significant gaps in Chinese compliance to the 2005 International Health Regulations.
The following section presents the results of each variable.Article 2 of IHR mandates member states to undertake measures to prevents the emergence and release of pathogens.As illustrated in the bar chart above, prior to the outbreak of Convid 19, the GHS index data reveal that China did not take adequate measures to prevent the emergence or release of pathogenic bacterial.Information drawn from the GHS index indicates though there are series of laws (Law No. 71 of 2007) and other standards of zoonotic diseases, (Zoonotic diseases are illnesses that can spread between animals and people), there are no concrete national action plans and guidelines that account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern.There is no evidence of a department, or agency dedicated to zoonotic disease control that functions across ministries in China.Only the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) is in charge with the responsibility of animal disease surveillance and control.As evidenced in the Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention-CCDCP, in the period between 2015-2019 the Chinese government failed to submit report to the World Organisation for Animal Health -OIE on incidence of human cases of zoonotic diseases (CCDCP, 2020).Furthermore, GHS index could not find publicly available evidence of ongoing research that strive to determine the existence of dangerous pathogens and toxins in China.The failure to fully comply with article 2 of the IHR and the absence of a cohesive strategy to prevent the emergence and release of pathogens justified the fact that China was not fully prepared for an epidemic or pandemic.(flu); poliovirus (polio); HIV; tuberculosis, malaria and typhoid.The International Health Regulations (IHR) adopted by the World Health Organization (WHO) require states to immediately notify the WHO of events that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern.Article 7 of the IHR in particular obliges parties to IHR to notify the WHO of all events within their territories that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern with 24 hours.The coronavirus pandemic happens to have a litmus test to Chinese health system.The outbreak of the pandemic highlights few strengths and core flaws in Chinese health care system.Although the analysis underpinned that officials downplayed early warning signs and failed to predict the gravity of Covid 19, a more worrying concern is the weakness of Chinese health care system to manage Public Health Emergency.As a consequence of Covid19, Chinese officials admitted the weaknesses of their public health system.In a rare circumstance, Premier Li Keqiang admitted their failings to strengthen monitoring and reporting system for infectious diseases.Premier Li Keqiang noted "many weak links have been exposed in public health emergency management.People have opinions and recommendations that deserve our attention.We must strive to improve our work, perform our duties effectively and do our best to live up to people's expectations," (New York Times, Jan 2020).Another testimony from Li Bin, the Director of China's National Health Commission underlined the limits of China's Public health system.Li underpinned that the pandemic has exposed the limits and how they address major pandemic and the public health challenges (BBC, May 2020).Therefore, it is evident that the Chinese government undermine article 5 (3) which orders state parties to the IHR to develop, strengthen, and maintain a robust health system that provides medical care to Public Health Emergency of International Concern.
The GHS index also ascertained the rate of China's compliance to international norms.This variable measured the rate of adherence to international agreements on public health emergency, particularly the observance of international commitments on financing; sharing of genetic and biological data and respect of fundamental principles on human rights.The information from the GHS index revealed that China scored only 40.3 for compliance with international norms while her peers like Turkey (upper middle-income county) scored 64.3 on a scale of 100.Although China had signed and ratified the conventions on the protection of human and people's rights, satisfied the United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 and enforcement measures for countering biological weapons, the Chinese government fell short on fulfilling international commitments or norms on financing.There is no evidence that China has set aside an emergency public finance mechanism or funds which the country can access in the face of a public health emergency.Moving unto respect of international human rights principles, Article 3 (1) proclaimed that "the implementation of IHR shall be in full respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons" Human rights are key in shaping the pandemic response, both for the public health emergency and the broader impact on people's lives and livelihoods.Responses that are shaped by and respect human rights result in better outcomes in beating the pandemic, ensuring healthcare for everyone and preserving human dignity.The IHR submits that in the context of serious public health threats and public emergencies threatening the life of the nation, restrictions on some human rights can be justified when they have a legal basis, are strictly necessary, based on scientific evidence and neither arbitrary nor discriminatory in application.The scale and severity of the coronavirus pandemic clearly qualify the level of a public health threat that could justify restrictions on certain rights.Amidst the global response to the pandemic, Human Rights Watch has been documenting rights abuses and The risk variable captured the level of global biological threats of unprecedented scale that could cause severe damage to human wellbeing.
Global preparedness for biological threats to public health in China is slightly above average.However, biosecurity and biosafety remain significantly under-prioritized areas of health security.The research investigated whether or not decision makers are taking adequate preparatory measures against highlyconsequential biological agents that have the potential of causing wide damage and spread of a novel infectious disease.The information gathered from the GHS index proffers that the Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention periodically run biosafety and biosecurity training courses for laboratory personnel, but there was no indication that the training utilized a standardized curriculum.More to that, the GHS index could not find evidence of an available public plan or policy to share biological materials or specimens with other countries and international organizations.

Implication of Non-Compliance to Global Health Security
"The health of every nation depends on the health of others" (Garrett Laurie, 2003) The Covid 19 pandemic presents an era of defining challenge to public health and the global security.The World Health Organization and the United Nations Security Council-UNSC, has increasingly framed risks posed by infectious diseases as an existential threat to global peace and security.Epidemics, and pandemics, or other forms of emerging infectious diseases are readily considered as direct threats to both national and global security.Since the year 2000, the WHO and the UNSC has tended to publicly engage issues of infectious diseases in security terms.In one of the earliest instances, on January 10, 2020, the UNSC resolution 1308 recognised pandemic outbreaks as a threat to global peace and security.In like manner, in 2001, the World Health Assembly resolution entitled "WHO Strategy for Global Health and Security" stressed on the integration of public health and security.Again, on September 18, 2014 the UNSC's resolution 2177 unanimously declared the Ebola Epidemic in Africa as threat to international peace and Security.The adoption of these resolution and its further endorsement by UN member states reveal the high degree to which the international community regard infectious diseases as a threat to national and international peace and security.disrupt the flow of humanitarian aids and distract conflicted parties and the international community from efforts geared towards peace and conflict resolutions.
The 2005 International Health Regulations carries with it an "Erga Omnes," which means rights and obligations towards all and towards every one.China's failure to comply with IHR undermine fundamental rights and obligations related to global health security.China's noncompliance with the 2005 IHR undermine the UN's fundamental principle of maintaining global peace and security.Though it is understandable that grappling with the outbreak of a novel disease is a challenge for any country.That notwithstanding, the health reforms undertaken by China prior and in the aftermath of Covid 19 demonstrate the critical role Beijing played in furthering the spread of the disease.The IHR generally have few tools at their disposal to enforce compliance, the actions of China prior to and in wake of the pandemic aptly demonstrate the inherent weaknesses of the international health laws.Although the UNSC in Chapter VII of the UN Charter to reminds states to observe the IHR, the absence of a statutory sanctioning mechanism to induce compliance demonstrate the endemic problem of states compliance with IHR.What does this therefore mean for the future of global health security?It must be agreed that with the present IHR, global health security is far from being assured.The challenge of a lack of statutory enforcement mechanism is insurmountable.Also, other global political challenges must be collectively overcome in order to achieve the marginal level of protection.

Conclusion
Arguably, the overriding conclusion that can be drawn in this article is that though IHR provided useful guidance to prevent, respond and manage the outbreak of pandemics, it generally has few tools at their disposal to enforce compliance.China's compliance prior to and in the aftermath of covid 19 has shown that the international community needs new legal enforcement mechanisms to ensure that states act promptly, transparently and effectively to protect the world's population against pandemics.The 2019 Global Health Security index stressed on the need for China to improve its response regarding the early detection, and reporting of infectious diseases.It also emphasized on the need for China to comply with core surveillance and notification health norms.Based on these gaps in China's national and international health laws, it remains uncertain what the future holds for global health security.It must be agreed that with the present IHR, global health security is far from being assured.The challenge of a lack of statutory enforcement mechanism is insurmountable.For a marginal level of protection to be achieved, other global political challenges must be collectively overcome through concerted and multilateral cooperative actions.This article proffers the view that one way to make this happen is to introduce statutory sanctions in the IHR and entrust its enforcement to the United Nations General Assembly-UNGA.Another way is to create a new United Nations Convention on pandemic Prevention.
As concerns early detection and reporting, China scored a minimal 48.5 in the global health index.The findings showed that China has the national capacity to detect infectious diseases.Its national laboratories conduct 5 of 10 WHO core tests for infectious diseases.The tests are influenza virus China was not eligible for the World Bank Pandemic Financing Facility.Regulations related to public health emergency management, such as the Emergency Response Law (2007), and the Overall Contingency Plan for National Public Emergencies (2014) stressed on the need for funds to be set aside in situations of public health emergencies.Despite enjoying decades of unprecedented economic growth, China's overall contributions to global health remain relatively low given its economic size.In the period between 2003 and 2014 China received 802 million USD as grants from The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.The top three donors, US, France and the UK contributed a total of 27.3 billion.It is only recently that China emerged as a major contributor to global health.As of early 2020, China was the 20 th largest donor to the Global Fund for health.
Although decades of rapid economic development enhanced China's capacity guard against infectious diseases, the outbreak of a novel coronavirus disease in late 2019 laid bare critical weaknesses in China's compliance to the 2005 International Health Regulations.China lacked of full capability and the political will impaired global health security.The outcome of the analysis revealed that China was not fully prepared for a global health catastrophe.Political leaders in China made costly mistakes that impaired the country's response and allowed the virus to spread from its origin in Wuhan to other parts of the country, and eventually around the world.Within a few months, millions of people had been infected and hundreds of thousands of individuals had lost their lives.The coronavirus pandemic indisputably presents a defining challenge to public health and the global security.According to WHO data, as of August 31, 2020, COVID-19, virus had infected more than 24 million people and left more than 800,000 dead.(WHO, 2020).The coronavirus is now perceived as an existential threaten people's lives and safety around the world.Its undulling effects on global health security have a spilled over effect with global economic and geopolitical implications.Both develop and developing countries have been severely hit in the after math of the crisis.For instance, In the first quarter of 2020 China's economy shrank 6.8% while in the first half of 2020 Eurozone economies contracted by 12.1% while GDP dropped by 11.9%.(TheEconomist,  2020).No EU country has been spared from the consequences of the pandemic, by the first half of 2020, the Spanish economy was the hardest hit with a contraction rate of 18%.Whereas Portugal was second with 14.1% while France and Italy registered drops in 13.8% and 12.4% respectively.The impact on developing economies is not any much different.The possible geopolitical implication of Covid 19 rest on the rise of authoritarianism, democratic backsliding and nationalist far-right political movements around the globe.The pandemic has caused the rescheduling and suspension of legislative and presidential elections around the globe.According to the Economist by April 2020 at least 84 countries had declared a state of emergency in response to the pandemic, leading to fears about misuse of power (The Economist, 2020).The outreach of the pandemic has particularly wreaked havoc in fragile states, it has further triggered wide spread political unrest,